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this situation, Congress should enact legislation giving EPA a
veto power over all projects in navigable waters including water
resource development projects proposed by federal agencies
(especially the Corps of Engineers) and private power com-
panies under federal permit. The President's Advisory Council
on Executive Reorganization has recommended that this veto
power be given to the proposed Department of Natural Re-
sources. However, EPA with its mission-oriented structure is
more suited to evaluate such problems free from the pressures
of special interest groups.
Robert B. Nichols, Jr.
A SELEcTED APPROACH TO ELECTION OF RmvDIEs
IN MINERAL TRESPASS CASES
Plaintiffs brought suit for recovery of the value of minerals
produced under a mineral lease granted to defendant on prop-
erty claimed by plaintiffs. After a determination that plaintiffs
were in fact the owners of the land in question, the court of
appeal held, that plaintiffs' suit for the value of the oil produced
from their property was an action in tort, subject to the pre-
scription of one year, and that the only damages recoverable
by plaintiffs were for the value of the oil produced during
the year immediately preceding the filing of suit, less their
proportionate share of drilling and operating costs for that
period. White v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 232 So.2d 83 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, April 20, 1970.
Before the advent of the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure, a
party entitled to recover damages under alternative theories
was held to have elected one remedy over others according to
the legal theory upon which his pleadings were based and the
remedy prayed for.' Thus, the theory of plaintiff's pleadings
determined the applicable prescriptive period, cause of action,
and measure of damages.2 For example, if a suit involving a
taking of movables could be brought alternatively under Civil
Code article 2315 and the quasi-contractual concept of unjust
enrichment, the prescriptive period would be one year for
the former cause of action and ten years for the latter. Further-
more, damages would be measured by the value of the thing
1. See Importsales v. Lindeman, 231 La. 663, 92 So.2d 574 (1957).
2. Kramer v. Freeman, 198 La. 244, 3 So.2d 609 (1941).
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taken under article 23153 or by the amount by which the
defendant had been enriched under the quasi-contractual theory.4
This theory of election of remedies had its origins in the com-
mon law writ system, according to which, if the commission
of a tort resulted in the enrichment of defendant at plaintiff's
expense, plaintiff might "waive his tort" and sue in assumpsit.
Louisiana jurisprudence has long recognized the availability
of alternative remedies in cases involving the unauthorized
taking of movables.6 However, the practical impact of this right
to alternative remedies was somewhat curtailed by the previously
discussed "theory of the case" doctrine which prevailed under
the Code of Practice. Early cases involving the unauthorized
taking of minerals acknowledged the election possibility;7 how-
ever, when the wording of the petition expressed the demand
in terms of the value of oil taken for the purpose of measuring
damages, the courts, in holding the language to be controlling,'
invariably concluded that the party had elected to proceed in
tort. Classification of the action as one in tort was based on
the theory that a demand for the value of the thing taken was
in fact a demand for damages9 and, as such, was controlled
by the principles of article 2315 and subject to the prescription
of one year.'0
It is along the lines of these earlier cases that White v.
3. Liles v. Producers' Oil Co., 155 La 385, 99 So. 339 (1924).
4. Rosenthal-Brown Fur Co. v. Jones-Frere Co., 162 La. 403, 110 So. 630
(1926).
5. Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in Civil Law and Louisiana Law,
Part II, 37 TUL. L. Rmv. 49, 51-52 (1962). Assumpsit was originally based on
a fictitious implied-in-law promise, but was substantially an action for unjust
enrichment. Nevertheless, the quasi-contractual relationship was still based
on the tort and had no existence independent of it.
6. Kramer v. Freeman, 198 La. 244, 3 So.2d 609 (1941); Liles v. Barnhart,
152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922); Morgan's La. & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Stewart,
119 La. 392, 44 So. 138 (1907).
7. Liles v. Texas Co., 166 La. 293, 117 So. 229 (1928).
8. Martin v. Texas Co., 150 La. 556, 90 So. 922 (1921).
9. Liles v. Producers' Oil Co., 155 La. 385, 99 So. 339 (1924); Martin v.
Texas Co., 150 La. 556, 90 So. 922 (1921); Harper v. Municipality No. 1, 12
La. Ann. 346 (1857).
10. Liles v. Producers' Oil Co., 155 La. 385, 99 So. 339 (1924); Liles v.
Barnhart, 152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922). According to language in Liles v.
Barnhart, this result followed naturally from analogizing the wrongful ex-
traction of oil to the unauthorized cutting of timber. See Davis v. Ruddock
Orleans Cypress Co., 132 La. 985, 62 So. 114 (1912); Shields v. Whitlock &
Brown, 110 La. 714, 34 So. 747 (1903). Of course, these latter cases, unlike
their mineral counterparts, have explicit code authority in LA. CIv. CODE art.
3537, which specifically applies the one-year prescriptive period "where land,
timber, or property has been injured, cut, damaged or destroyed."
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Phillips Petroleum Co." was decided. The demand was for the
value of the minerals wrongfully taken, and the majority used
the prior jurisprudence to classify plaintiffs' action as one in
tort. In a concurring opinion, however, Judge (now Justice)
Tate stated that there are now valid reasons for not holding
plaintiff to an election governed by his petition, and for allow-
ing him to recover under any available theory, if he has alleged
and proved the facts substantiating relief, regardless of the
remedy originally prayed for. His opinion was based on plead-
ing changes in the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure; his conclu-
sions appear valid. Under the new Code, courts are required
to "grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it [the
judgment] is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain
no prayer for general and equitable relief."' 2 Technical rules
of pleading no longer exist,13 and the characterization of a
pleading by the litigant is no longer controlling. 4 All that is
required is that the plaintiff allege material facts constituting
a cause of action.' 5 The net result is a reinforcement of the
principle implicit in the Code that the theory of the case doctrine
is not applicable in Louisiana."e
"In cases such as this one, a property owner who pleads and
proves the necessary facts should be allowed to recover under
any available theory, whether tort, quasi-contract, or even
revendication. To bar recovery simply by strictly construing
the pleadings is to abandon the spirit of the 1960 Code of Civil
Procedure."' 7 This expression by Justice Tate appears to be
the major weakness of the holding of the instant case. Even
though the plaintiffs' remedy in tort in this case was barred
by the prescription of one year, it should have been possible
for plaintiff to have alleged and proved that the defendant had
acquired a valuable property right and had been unjustly
enriched at plaintiff's expense.
11. 232 So.2d 83 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
12. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 862.
13. Boudreaux v. Allstate Fin. Corp., 217 So.2d 439 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1968).
14. Bellow v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters, Inc., 215 So.2d 350
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
15. White v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 232 So.2d 83, 91 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1970).
16. LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 862, comment (b). See also Poynter v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co., 140 So.2d 42 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).




Admitting that the wording of the petition should not now
be the controlling factor, it may still be of some importance
in determining whether plaintiffs should have been allowed to
amend their petition on appeal to pray for relief grounded in
restitution based upon defendant's unjust enrichment. Basically,
this would have involved a determination of what new evidence
would have been required to sustain the demand. As Justice
Tate noted, "[c]haracterization of the plaintiffs' action was
neither briefed nor argued by counsel."'8 It might be inferred,
therefore, that the record on appeal did not substantiate this
latter theory of recovery. Under the old Code of Practice, this
situation would have precluded amendment on appeal,19 but
the liberalized procedures under the new Code would allow
amendment to conform to the evidence contained in the record.
Justice Tate, in commenting on the Code of Civil Procedure,
has said that "[t]he court must balance the injustice of amend-
ment to one against the injustice to the other by denial, taking
into consideration the ultimate ideal of our Code that procedural
rules exist only to facilitate substantive justice and the deci-
sion of the cases on the merits. '20 If motion for leave to amend
the pleadings on appeal were allowed, then, clearly, under
article 2164 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an appellate court
could render judgment based upon the amended petition. 21
Granted that the court in White did not reach the substan-
tive issue of recovery, the case hypothetically poses at least
three possible theories under which relief might have been
granted-revendication, tort, or quasi-contract. 22 Notwithstand-
ing certain theoretical anomalies,23 the availability of a real
action for the recovery of movables in kind is well recognized
in the jurisprudence.24 However, its application in cases involv-
18. Id. at 91 (concurring opinion).
19. Cf. White v. Davis, 173 La. 558, 138 So. 101 (1931).
20. Tate, Amendment of Pleadings in Louisiana, 43 TUL. L. REV. 211, 240
(1969).
21. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2164 authorizes the appellate court to render
"any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record." The
"record" includes the pleadings as made in the trial court. See Tate, Amend-
ment of Pleadings in Louisiana, 43 TUL. L. REV. 211, 239 n.177 (1969).
22. White v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 232 So.2d 83, 92 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1970) (concurring opinion).
23. LA. CODE Cxv. P. art. 422 defines a real action as "one brought to
enforce rights in, to or upon immovable property," and thus leaves room
for speculation as to the nature of actions brought concerning movables.
See 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIviL LAW TREATISE § 135 at 405 (1966).
24. Lusco v. McNeese, 86 So.2d 226, 228 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956), citing
Donnell v. Gray, 215 La. 497, 41 So.2d 66 (1949); Fontenot v. Johnson,
77 So.2d 82 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954); Schutzman v. Munson, 51 So.2d 125 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1951); Crain v. Crain, 29 So.2d 404 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
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ing minerals is somewhat dubious because the things involved
are consumable, refinable for future consumption, and, there-
fore, impossible to return. A possible avoidance of the problem
here is the use of the power of the court to issue writs of
sequestration, 25 thus preserving the movables in question in
order that a plaintiff may later avail himself of the action in
revendication. According to the jurisprudence, this procedure is
available in actions involving minerals.26 If the revendicatory
action is utilized, the courts would probably apply the ten-year
liberative prescription provided for actions in contract or quasi-
contract,27 although the French sources28 and better-reasoned
considerations point more correctly toward the imprescrip-
tibility of the action. Title may be lost by good or bad faith
acquisitive prescription, but the real action to vindicate title
does not prescribe.29
More conventionally, recovery for the movables taken can
be had in a delictual action under Civil Code article 2315 which
prescribes after one year from discovery of the damage accord-
ing to articles 3536 and 3537. The measure of recoverable
damages includes the value of the property taken 0 less ex-
penses if the mineral operations were conducted in good
faith. 1 Credit to the good faith tortfeasor in the latter cir-
25. Article 3571 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "when one
claims the ownership or right of possession of property . . . he may have
the property seized under a writ of sequestration, If it Is within the power
of the defendant to conceal, dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues
therefrom, or remove the property from the parish, during the pendency of
the action."
26. See Jennings & Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latrielle Oil Co.,
127 La. 971, 54 So. 318 (1911); Kellar v. Victoria Lumber Co., 45 La. Ann.
476, 12 So. 511 (1893).
27. Kramer v. Freeman, 198 La. 244, 3 So.2d 609 (1941).
28. 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIvIL LAW TRATISs § 125, at 381 (1966).
29. According to article 3509 of the Civil Code, a bad faith possessor
of a movable acquires title after ten years uninterrupted possession. As
his possession may well not run concurrently with an owner's Zoss of pos-
session, the Interpretation given to the article by the jurisprudence may
create a situation where the action is barred even if the bad faith possessor
has yet to acquire title.
30. See Importsales v. Lindeman, 231 La. 663, 92 So.2d 574 (1957).
31. Huckabay v. Texas Co., 227 La. 191, 78 So.2d 829 (1955); Martel v.
Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 114 La. 351, 38 So. 253 (1906). Deduction of
expenses has not been allowed for bad faith mineral operations: State v. Jef-
ferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145 (1935). But see Chief
Justice O'Niell's dissent in Leopold v. Bradford-Hutchinson Lumber Co., 172
La. 110, 133 So. 379 (1931), where the Chief Justice argues that the refusal to
deduct expenses for bad faith-involving here timber operations-was In fact
an award of punitive damages, which are unrecoverable in Louisiana. He
argued that the court's opinion had been based on a faulty interpretation of
article 525 of the Civil Code, plus references to cases decided at a time when
the courts had allowed punitive damage awards under certain circumstances.
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cumstance has been held to be a consequence of both "the moral
maxim of the law that no one ought to enrich himself at the
expense of another, '82 and an interpretation of Civil Code
articles 501 and 502 which equate minerals to fruits in this
area of the law.s8
Damages, moreover, should not be limited to the value of
the thing wrongfully taken. Their measure "ought to be any
pecuniary prejudice suffered by the plaintiff as the result of
wrongful possession. 81 4 Thus, in addition to the value of the
oil itself, it is possible to consider the right to search for oil
as a valuable property right protected by more than the usual
award of nominal damages for a non-injurious trespass. This
possibility has already been recognized by the Louisiana courts
in the analogous area of the so-called "geophysical trespass"
cases involving unauthorized entry upon land for the purpose
of conducting seismographic and other geophysical surveys. The
courts here have recognized that these intrusions involve the
unlawful taking of a property right and have awarded damages.85
Early cases used the extent of the loss of the mineral leasing
desirability of plaintiff's property, after the defendant's un-
authorized geological survey showed the unlikelihood of profit-
able production, as the measure of damages. s6 This would not
be a suitable measure in the unauthorized drilling situation
on productive property. Nevertheless, this right to explore is
analogous to the right to drill situation of White. Therefore,
the use of the leasing value of comparable adjacent property
at the time of the trespass as the measure of damages, an
approach approved in the more recent geophysical trespass
cases,s1 would also be appropriate in instances of unauthorized
drilling.
"Where the unlawful act of one person not only damages
32. Huckabay v. Texas Co., 227 La. 191, 197, 78 So.2d 829, 831 (1955).
33. See Martel v. Hunt, 195 La. 701, 197 So. 402 (1940); cf. Jackson v.
Shaw, 151 La. 795, 92 So. 339 (1922).
34. 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CivIL LAW TREATISE § 144, at 436 n.310 (1966).
35. Picou v. Fohs Oil Co., 222 La. 1068, 64 So.2d 434 (1953); Layne La.
Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So.2d 20 (1946). The holder of a
mineral servitude has the same action available to him as does the owner
of the land. Holcombe v. Superior Oil Co., 213 La. 684, 35 So.2d 457 (1948).
36. See Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940).
37. Of. Franklin v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 218 La. 987, 51 So.2d 600 (1951);
Layne La. Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So.2d 20 (1946), where the
court recognized the amount paid to neighboring landowners for the privilege
of conducting geological surveys as a proper measure of damages where a
value depreciation award would be overly speculative.
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another but enriches the wrongdoer, there is an action both
ex-delicto and ex-contractu and the action to recover the un-
lawful gain is barred only by the prescription of 10 years."3 8
Thus, the relationship of quasi-contract and the unjust enrich-
ment of the defendant must be considered as a third theory
of recovery, based on the "moral maxim" expressed in Civil
Code article 1965 that "no one ought to enrich himself at the
expense of another." 89 The quasi-contractual relationship in-
volved in the unauthorized taking of another's movables may
be implied directly from article 229440 or indirectly from the
language of articles 2301 and following. Although it has been
noted that, technically, article 23014'1 refers merely to a mistaken
payment by the plaintiff to the defendant,4 2 the Louisiana juris-
prudence has widened its meaning by considering receipt with-
out payment as sufficient and by treating a wrongful taking as
a receipt. 43
The courts have thus established a line of reasoning which
allows them to view an unauthorized taking of another's prop-
erty as a case of unjustified enrichment without any legal
relationship between the parties other than the act itself. Con-
sequently, they are able to apply article 1965 to the broadened
interpretation of article 2301. In other words, the unjustified
enrichment establishes the quasi-contractual connection. Thus,
even if the facts of the case do not relate an ulterior con-
tractual demand of the plaintiff, such as ratification of a lease,44
or acknowledgment of a servitude,45 the quasi-contractual rela-
tion will have been established through the defendant's overt
38. Liles v. Barnhart, 152 La. 419, 444, 93 So. 490, 499 (1922) (concurring
opinion), citing Burney v. Ludeling, 47 La. Ann. 73, 16 So. 507 (1894); Mc-
Knight v. Calhoun, 36 La. Ann. 408 (1884); Gaty, McCune & Co. v. Barbers, 32
La. Ann. 1091 (1880); Normand v. Edwards, 23 La. Ann. 142 (1871); Devot
v. Marx, 19 La. Ann. 491 (1867); Pickerel v. Fisk, 11 La. Ann. 277 (1856);
Kohn v. Carrollton, 10 La. Ann. 719 (1855).
39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1965.
40. Id. art. 2294. The article lists two principal kinds of acts which give
rise to the relationship: "[Tihe transaction of another's business, and the
payment of a thing not due." It does not, however, say that these are the
only situations from which the relationship may be derived.
41. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2301: "He who receives what is not due to him,
whether he receives it through error or knowingly, obliges himself to restore
it to him from whom he had unduly received it."
42. Nicholas, Unjustifted Enrichment in Civil Law and Louisiana Law,
Part II, 37 TUL. L. REv. 49, 51 (1962).
43. See Standard Oil Co. v. Sugar Prod. Co., 160 La. 763, 107 So. 566 (1926);
Roney v. Peyton, 159 So. 469 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
44. Liles v. Barnhart, 152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922).
45. Nelson v. Young, 255 La. 1043, 234 So.2d 54 (1970).
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act. Cases involving the unauthorized trapping of animals 46
point to the propriety of this interpretation. Faced with the
same dilemma as in White-an unauthorized taking of a thing
not classifiable as a "fruit"-the courts relied upon the "moral
maxim" of article 1965 to condemn the defendants to return to
the plaintiffs the rewards of their ill-gotten gains.
In computing the measure of damages in the action for
unjust enrichment, it is readily apparent that recovery will
be of a limited nature. Its extent will be the undue gain of the
party or parties against whom the action is brought, without
the possibility of recovery in solido from any party, as in the
joint tortfeasor-type situations. Recovery would be merely the
amount of enrichment-the thing itself if still in the defendant's
possession, or his gains from its disposal if not, measured by
the gross income produced less expenses. The latter measure
is a necessary result of the principle itself, for failure to allow
the deduction of costs would unjustly enrich the plaintiff by
that amount at the expense of the defendant. 47
In conclusion, it should be realized that the procedural
aspects of the holding in White are the paramount considera-
tions of the case, and, if drawn to their logical conclusion, would
signal, as Justice Tate indicated in his concurring opinion,
''a reversion to an outmoded and expressly discarded procedural
concept.'48 The holding should be narrowly construed, based
on the absence of any characterization, by brief or argument,
of the plaintiffs' action.40 To do otherwise would suggest a
return to a "theory of the case" approach to pleadings entirely
inconsistent with the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure. Neverthe-
less, it should also be recognized that, in order to take advantage
of the liberalized procedures, a plaintiff must allege and prove
facts that will show the existence of a given cause of action,
and that a demand for damages and presentation of a case in
strictly delictual terms, with no reference to the defendant's
unjust enrichment, would still preclude any recovery under
quasi-contract and the prescriptive advantages arising therefrom.
Jerald L. Perlman
46. See Curran v. Jones, 163 La. 579, 112 So. 492 (1927); Rosenthal-Brown
Fur Co. v. Jones-Frere Fur Co., 162 La. 403, 110 So. 630 (1926).
47. See Huckabay v. Texas Co., 227 La. 191, 78 So.2d 829 (1955); Scott v.
Hunt Oil Co., 152 So.2d 599 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
48. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term
-Mineral Rights, 31 LA. L. REv. 363, 364 (1970).
49. White v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 232 So.2d 83, 92 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1970) (concurring opinion).
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